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JOB SEARCHERS, JOB MATCHES
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ABSTRACT
This paper stresses the importance of a specification of the matching function in which the
measure of job matches corresponds to the measure of job searchers. In many empirical studies
on the matching function this requirement has not been fulfilled because it is difficult to find
information about employed job searchers and job searchers from outside the labour market. In
this paper, we specify and estimate matching functions where the flow corresponds to the correct
stock. We use several approximations for the stock of non-unemployed job searchers. We find
that the estimation results are sensitive to the approximation we use. Our main conclusion is that
it is important to account for the behaviour of non-unemployed job searchers since otherwise the
estimated parameters of the matching function may be seriously biased.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The most practised model of aggregate labour market flows is the matching or hiring function.
The matching function describes how the flow of job matches is related to the stock of job
searchers and the stock of available jobs, much as a standard production function describes the
technological relation between the flow of products and the stocks of production factors. There
have been numerous efforts to specify and estimate matching functions for a number of countries.
Cf. Pissarides (1986), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Layard et al. (1991), Van Ours
(1991,1995), Burda and Wyplosz (1994).
In much of the theoretical matching literature, job vacancies match with unemployed
workers, yielding a flow of matches, i.e. a flow of unemployed persons finding jobs. See, .g.
Pissarides (1990). One of the issues in theoretical and empirical research is the position of
employed job searchers. In a lot of studies employed job searchers are simply ignored. In
theoretical studies this is motivated by the mathematical complications involved. An important
exception is Pissarides (1994). In many empirical studies employed job search is ignored because
of a lack of suitable data. Then, job matches are approximated by the flow of out of
unemployment. Yet, the composition of the flows to employment changes over the business cycle
(Schettkat (1996)). In recessions the flow from unemployment to employment increases relative
to the flow from job to job. While most of the outflow from unemployment will involve the filling
of a job, there may also be a number of unemployed that move out of the labour force. In order to
counteract this flaw, in some studies only the flow of male unemployed is taken, under the
assumption that the flow of unemployed moving out of the labour force mainly consists of
women. Other studies use the total hires as an approximation for the number of matches.
However, hires not only include unemployed finding a job, but also the flow of persons out of the
labour force, like school-leavers, to a job and the flow of employed workers moving to another
job. This means that no longer job vacancies and unemployed job searchers are matched, but
instead vacancies and all job searchers. The same applies to the flow of filled vacancies, which
sometimes is used to approximate the flow of matches. Vacancies are not necessarily filled only
by unemployed job searchers; they are open for all job searchers alike. So also in this case, the
pool of unemployed job searchers in the matching function should be replaced by the pool of all
job searchers. Despite all these different measures, in practically all studies job matches are
related to the stock of unemployed and the stock of vacancies in the matching function.
A different issue is whether a matching function has constant returns to scale. It is difficult
to give an explanation for constant returns to scale. Pissarides (1990) argues that only constant
returns to scale lead to a stationary unemployment rate. Other explanations focus on the
inadequate discrete time intervals, which are used when estimating the continuous time function
(Burdett et al. 1994). Burgess (1993) claims that the exclusion of employed job searchers may
lead to an underestimation of the returns to scale of the matching function.
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This paper shows that both in theory and in practise different measures of job matches and
their corresponding stock of job searchers result in different matching elasticities. In the
theoretical part of the paper we show that if non-unemployed job searchers are ignored the
returns to scale of the matching function are downward biased. If only the flow from
unemployment to employment is considered to represent the flow of matches we find that the
returns to scale are upward biased. We illustrate this theoretical finding using results from
previous empirical studies. In the empirical part of the paper we analyse data from The
Netherlands. We show the estimation results for a number of alternative specifications of the
matching function. Our main conclusion is that the estimated parameters of the matching function
depend very much on the way the numbers of non-unemployed job searchers are accounted for.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework that stresses
the importance of conformity of the stocks in the matching process and the flow of job matches.
Section 3 discusses the results of previous research along the lines of the theoretical framework.
Estimates of this matching function, using pooled cross-section data on six sectors in The Nether-
lands economy from 1988.II-1994.IV, are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. JOB SEARCHERS AND JOB MATCHES
The process of matching workers and jobs is not an instantaneous process. Workers and firms are
engaged in a time-consuming (stochastic) process of finding an appropriate match. The matching
process is formalised by the matching function, which gives the flow of new hires from some pool
of job searchers as a function of that same pool of job searchers and the pool of available job
vacancies.
where F is the flow of job searchers being matched to a job, M is the matching function, S is the
stock of job searchers, V is the stock of available job vacancies, and c is a scale parameter. For
the sake of reasoning, we assume time to be continuous.
This matching function is analogous to an aggregate production function. It shows that
labour market flows generate delays in the finding of both jobs and workers, even when the
matching process is very efficient. The efficiency of the matching process is represented by c in
(1). Changes in the value of c capture changes in the geographic and skill characteristics of
workers and jobs or other differences between the two, as well as differences in search behaviour
between job searchers.
In this section we show that different measures of matching, and hence different stocks of
job searchers, imply quite different values for the elasticities of matching. We distinguish between
persons on unemployment insurance, persons on welfare benefits, employed job searchers and job
,VS,cM = F )( (1)
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searchers not in the labour force. Figure 1 presents the flows between the different labour market
states that are relevant in our study.
* Figure 1 somewhere here *
In Figure 1, the unemployed with an unemployment insurance benefit, U, and the unemployed
with a welfare benefit, Us, together build registered unemployment, UR. In the sequel we refer to
the unemployed with an unemployed insurance benefit as ‘the unemployed’. The job searchers not
in the labour force, or non-participants, are labelled N. Only a certain proportion of this group
searches for a job, mainly school-leavers and married women re-entering the labour market.
Finally, E represents the employed persons.
Based on earlier arguments, a matching function based on Fue, the flow of unemployed on
unemployment insurance, should contain U as stock of job searchers, whereas a matching
function based on F should have S as stock of job searchers. We assume that all successful job
searchers get a job by filling a vacancy.
The matching function (1) is usually specified in a Cobb-Douglas form
where X is the stock of non-unemployed job searchers, that is all job searchers except those with
an unemployment insurance benefit. X consists of job searchers with a welfare benefit, employed
job searchers and job searchers not in the labour force. Furthermore α∈(0,1) and β∈(0,1) are the
elasticities of matching with respect to the stock of job searchers and the stock of vacancies. They
show the effect of job matches to a change in S or V. Constant returns to scale implies that
α+β=1.
Since X and U are probably not independent the elasticity of the flow of matched job
seekers with respect to the number of unemployed is
If unemployment goes up the stock of non-unemployed job searchers will probably go up less
than proportional. If unemployment goes up employed workers who are risk averse will stop or
reduce their search activities. Furthermore, if unemployment goes up the job searchers who are as
yet outside the labour market will also reduce or stop their search activities because of a
discouraged worker effect.
We define the elasticity of the stock of non-unemployed job searchers as

















































Since the stock of non-unemployed job searchers increases less than proportional with
unemployment, εxu < 1 and
So, if the stock of non-unemployed job searchers is ignored we underestimate the true value of the
matching elasticity with respect to the number of job seekers. Since the estimate of the matching
elasticity with respect to vacancies is not affected we conclude that ignoring the stock of non-
unemployed job searchers leads to an underestimation of the returns to scale of the matching
function.
Now, we consider what happens if we use the flow from unemployment to a job as an
indicator of the number of matches. We assume that this flow is proportional to the total flow to a
job. The factors of proportionality are the stocks of unemployment and total job searchers.
Furthermore, we allow for the possibility that there is a difference in the efficiency of search
between unemployed and non-unemployed job searchers:
where c1/c indicates the relative search efficiency of the unemployed job searchers. From this it
follows that
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So, if we ignore both the stock of non-unemployed job searchers and the flow from non-
unemployment to employment we overestimate the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to the number of job searchers. All in all we find
This means that the true elasticity α of the matching function has a value that lies between the
elasticity of a matching function that models the flow of filled vacancies and the stock of
unemployment and the elasticity of a matching function that models the flow of unemployed
leaving unemployment and the stock of unemployment.
3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Most of the empirical studies of the matching function are hampered by the fact that the flow of
persons moving to a job does not always originate from the pool of job searchers in the matching
function. In almost all studies, the pool of job searchers equals the stock of unemployed. In that
case, ideally, the flow of matches should equal the flow of hires from unemployment. However,
some studies approximate the flow of matches by the total hires. In this case the matches include
much more than just the flow from unemployment into employment. Workers moving from one
job to another fill many vacancies. In addition, a substantial part of the vacancies are filled by the
flow of persons out of the labour force to a job, mostly school-leavers. So in this case, the stock
of job searchers is much larger than the stock of unemployed. On the other hand, the job being
filled does not necessarily have to be a vacancy. It can be an idle job or the unemployed can start
an own business, etc. So also the stock of available jobs is probably larger than the stock of
vacancies. This latter argument does not apply when the flow of filled vacancies is used as an
approximation of the flow of matches. Here, the pool of available jobs is indeed the stock of
vacancies. However, a vacancy does not necessarily have to be filled by an unemployed job













vacancy. Hence, the pool of job searchers is, also in this case, much larger than just the stock of
unemployed. Nevertheless, in all empirical studies, where matches are total hires or filled
vacancies, unemployment is assumed to be sufficient to represent the job searchers in the
matching function. Cf. Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Van Ours (1991), Gorter and Van Ours
(1994).
Many other studies use the outflow out of unemployment to approximate the flow of
matches. This means that the actual flow of job matches by unemployed is overestimated,
because no account is being taken of the unemployed moving out of the labour force. Sometimes,
one tries to prevent this flaw by applying only the male outflow out of unemployment, assuming
that mostly female unemployed move out of the labour force. Cf. Pissarides (1986), Layard et al.
(1991), Burda and Wyplosz (1994). Also in this case, the persons moving out of unemployment
do not necessarily fill a vacancy.
The fact that the measure of job matches does not correspond to the pool of job searchers
may bias the elasticity of the matching process with respect to the pool of job searchers and
vacancies. Table 1 presents a comparison of studies of the matching function for a number of
countries and shows the relation between certain measures of job matches and the values of the
matching elasticity. It presents the dependent variable in (1) and shows the range of measures
used to represent this flow of matches. It also reports the frequency of the data and the elasticities
of matching with respect to the stock of job searchers, usually unemployed, and vacancies.
Table 1 shows a dichotomy for the values of the matching elasticity with respect to
unemployment, α and the measure of job matches. When the dependent variable is the outflow of
unemployed (UO) or the hires from unemployed (HU), the value of α>0.5. On the other hand, if
the dependent variable is the total hires (H), the flow of filled vacancies (F) or the hires from
employment (HE), we find α<0.5. The value of α for the flow from persons not in the labour
force (HO) is ambiguous. In many studies the stock of unemployed serves to represent the
relevant stock of job searchers.
* Table 1 somewhere here *
In theory the flow of matches is defined in continuous time. Therefore the frequency of the data
used to estimate the matching function should be high. We use quarterly data from The
Netherlands. Our data set has the advantage that the measures of job matches, the flow of
unemployed to a job and the flow of filled vacancies, can be linked to the correct stocks of job
searchers and available jobs. The data cover the period 1988-1994 in which no major changes in
the definition of the relevant variables occurred. The last major change in definitions in
unemployment, vacancies and unemployment outflow occurred in 1987. Since that year the
official vacancy statistics are collected in a firm survey, which also takes account of unreported
vacancies. In 1987 there also was a change in legislation with respect to the unemployment
insurance act. For more details on our data set we refer to Appendix 1.
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In order to get an operational specification for (2) and (3), we use a log-linear form. Furthermore,
we use information from different economic sectors i. Ignoring indices for time we have
where ξi=log (ci) and φi=log(c1i), are sector-specific fixed effects. As indicated before, the two
intercept terms reflect the concept that the efficiency of matching differs between unemployed and
other job searchers. Apart from that we allow for differences in matching efficiency between
economic sectors.
The reference period covers 1989.I-1994.IV. We include six economic sectors: agriculture,
manufacturing, construction, commercial services 1 (i.e. trade, hotels, restaurants, banks,
insurance, etc.), commercial services 2 (i.e. transport, storage and communication) and non-
commercial services.
One of the problems in the estimation of matching functions is that there is no exact
information on the numbers of non-unemployed job searchers. We investigate the sensitivity of
the estimation results by analysing the effects of different assumptions with respect to the stock of
non-unemployed job searchers.
In our first estimates we assume that X=0, which is equivalent to the assumption that the
elasticity εxu=1, or in other words: the stock of non-unemployed job searchers changes
proportional to the changes in the stock of unemployed job searchers. When estimating both
equations separately we find the following coefficients (t-values):
    matching elasticities
dependent variable:          job searchers      vacancies
log(Fue/U-1)  0.55   (14.2) 0.01   (0.5)
log(F/V-1) -0.08    (1.0)  0.47   (10.6)
In the equation with the outflow from unemployment as dependent variable the match elasticity
with respect to unemployment is 0.55, while the match elasticity with respect to vacancies does
not differ significantly from zero. In the equation with the total flow of vacancies as the
dependent variable the estimation results are very different. Here we find that the match elasticity
with respect to the number of job searchers does not differ significantly from zero, while the
iiiiii VXUVF log)1()log()/log( −+++= βαξ
iiiiiiue VXUUF log)log()1()/log( , βαφ ++−+=
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match elasticity with respect to vacancies is 0.47. So, as predicted in Section 2 the elasticity of
the matches with respect to unemployment is higher if the matches concern the outflow from
unemployment in stead of the total flow of filled vacancies.
If we impose the matching elasticities to be the same in both equations and estimate the
model using iterative seemingly unrelated regression as estimation technique we find that the
matching coefficients are about equal with a value of about 0.15. The estimation results are
shown in Table 2.
* Table 2 somewhere here *
The Wald test on the null hypothesis of α+β=1 equals χ2(1)=191.6, which cannot be accepted at
any reasonable significance level. So, we find that the matching function is characterised by
decreasing returns to scale.
In our second estimation we assume that the number of non-unemployed job searchers is
equal to the sum of specific shares of the employed workers, the workers collecting welfare
benefits and the non-participants.
Xit = 0.1 Eit + 0.5 Bit + 0.07 Nt
We assume that 10% of the employed work force searches for another job. This percentage is
based on Boeri (1995), who studied employed job search in a number of OECD countries. Next,
we assume that only 50% of the persons receiving a welfare benefit actually search for a job,
based on scattered evidence of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Netherlands Central Bureau
of Statistics (CBS). Finally, the assumption that only 7% of the non-participants search for a job
is based on various issues of the Labour Market Survey of the CBS. Non-participants are defined
as the number of persons between 20 and 64 minus the employed and minus persons receiving an
unemployment insurance benefit and those receiving a welfare benefit.
Note that we assume that the workers outside the labour market have no preference as to
which sector they are searching. In the context of the matching function the actual number of non-
unemployed job searchers is not very important. What is important is the way this number
covaries with the number of unemployed workers. Specified in this way we find that the simple
correlation between X and U is equal to -0.74. The average elasticity of the stock of non-
unemployed job searchers with respect to the number of unemployed turns out to be 0.11 (see
Appendix 3 for a description of the estimation procedure and results). So, the total number of job
searchers increases less than proportional with the number of unemployed workers. Therefore,
ignoring the non-unemployed job searchers will give too low an estimate of the supply ide effect
of the matching function.
* Table 3 somewhere here *
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Table 3 that gives the estimation results of the matching model with this specification of X
confirms this. The elasticity of the matches with respect to the number of vacancies is hardly
affected, but the elasticity of the matches with respect to the number of job searchers increases to
0.74. The sum of the two elasticities equals 0.90. The Wald test on constant returns to scale,
α+β=1, equals χ2(1)=3.322. Therefore, when account is being taken of other job searchers than
unemployed, the hypothesis of a matching function with constant returns to scale cannot be
rejected.
Finally, we estimate a model in which the number of non-unemployed job searchers is
specified as a function of the number of employed and the number of unemployed. In our third
estimates we assume that X can be written in a Cobb-Douglas form,
where γ = εxu and δ > 0. This enables us to estimate the elasticity of the number of non-
unemployed job searchers with respect to the number of unemployed within the context of a
matching model. Table 4 presents the estimation results.
* Table 4 somewhere here *
From this table we draw several conclusions. First, the elasticity of the matches with respect to
the number of vacancies again is hardly affected. The elasticity of the matches with respect to the
number of job searchers increases to 1.12, but is not significantly larger than 1. However the sum
of the two elasticities of the matching functions now equals 1.30. The Wald test on constant
returns to scale equals χ2(1)=37.67. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the matching
function has increasing returns to scale.
Second, the results imply a negative impact of unemployment, U, on the stock of all other
job searchers, X. The coefficient γ=-0.54 is significantly negative. This corroborates our earlier
premise of the pro-cyclical character of X. The effect of employment on the stock X is positive
and quite large, as δ=1.30.
Third, the matching efficiencies are in agreement with intuition. The fixed effects of the
model for both F and Fue show that the efficiency of matching in agriculture is relatively high in
both equations; the same applies to construction, whereas it is much more difficult to find a job in
manufacturing and in the services sectors. For unemployed it is relatively more difficult to get a
job in commercial services 1, while in commercial services 2 and non-commercial services it is
relatively more easy. This implies that agriculture and construction are more efficient in matching
jobs to job searchers than other sectors and that unemployed job searchers are relatively difficult
to match to jobs in commercial services 1, like trade, banks, etc.
,EU = X δγ (4)
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studies the properties of matching functions, in which the measure of job matches and
the pool of job searchers are consistent with each other. Our study is in line with Burgess
(1993,1994) who points out that employed job searchers build the largest flow into employment
and affect the standard matching approach substantially.
Different measures of job matches and their corresponding stock of job searchers, result in
different matching elasticities. In the theoretical part of the paper we show that if non-
unemployed job searchers are ignored the returns to scale of the matching function are downward
biased. If only the flow from unemployment to employment is considered we find that the returns
to scale are upward biased. We show that this finding is confirmed in previous studies. The
studies that use the flow from unemployment to a job as an indicator of the number of matches
find a substantially higher matching elasticity with respect to job searchers than the studies that
are based on the total inflow into a job.
The crucial parameter is the elasticity of the number of non-unemployed job searchers with
respect to the number of unemployed job searchers (εxu). We started our empirical analysis with
the assumption that εxu=1, which is similar to ignoring non-unemployed job searchers since this
number is proportional to the number of unemployed workers. Under this assumption we find that
the matching function has decreasing returns to scale. In our second estimation we assumed that
the number of non-unemployed job searchers is equal to the sum of certain fixed shares of the
numbers of employed workers, non-participating workers and workers on welfare benefits. Then,
on average εxu=0.1. Under this assumption we find that the matching function has constant
returns to scale. Finally we estimated εxu directly within the matching model framework finding a
value of -0.5. Then, we find that the matching function has increasing returns to scale.
All in all, we conclude that it is very important to account for the effect of non-unemployed
job searchers on the matching process. Whether or not a matching function has decreasing,
constant or increasing returns to scale depends very much on the way the non-unemployed job
searchers have been accounted for. This finding has important policy implications for aggregate
unemployment and the labour market position of individual unemployed. If indeed the matching
elasticity with respect to unemployment is close to 1 the total number of unemployed does not
affect the individual exit probabilities.
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Table 1. An International Comparison of Matching Elasticities
____________________________________________________________________________________
__
Dependent Authors Country   Data frequency Elasticity
variable        V    U
____________________________________________________________________________________
__
Total flow into a job
H Blanchard and Diamond (1989) USA        monthly   0.6 0.4
H Schettkat (1993) Germany      annual  0.2 0.0
H Anderson and Burgess (1994) USA    annual/panel  0.8 0.4
H Mumford and Smith (1995) Australia     monthly  0.3 0.3
F Van Ours (1991) Netherlands      annual  0.6 0.4
F Van Ours (1994) Netherlands      annual  0.6 0.4
F Gorter and Van Ours (1994) Netherlands       annual  0.7
0.3
Unemployment outflow into a job
HU Blanchard and Diamond (1989) USA         monthly   0.2 0.6
HU Schettkat (1993) Germany      annual  0.2 0.7
HU Mumford and Smith (1995) Australia     monthly   0.1 0.6
HU Van Ours (1995) Netherlands      annual   0.3 0.7
UO Pissarides (1986) UK        quarterly  0.3 0.7
UO Layard et al. (1991) UK       quarterly  0.3 0.7
UO Burgess (1993) UK        quarterly   0.4 0.6
UO Burda and Wyplosz (1994) France      monthly  0.3
0.7
UO Burda and Wyplosz (1994) Germany      monthly  0.3 0.7
UO Burda and Wyplosz (1994) Spain      monthly  0.2 0.8
UO Burda and Wyplosz (1994) UK      monthly  0.3 0.7
UO Broersma (1997) Netherlands       annual  0.3 0.7
UO Antolin (1994) Spain       annual  0.2 0.8
UO Eriksson and Pehkonen (1995) Finland      quarterly  0.2 0.8
Hires from outside the labour force
HO Blanchard and Diamond (1989) USA           monthly  0.2 0.6
HO Mumford and Smith (1995) Australia       monthly   0.4    -0.3
Hires from non-employment
HN Anderson and Burgess (1994) USA     annual/panel  0.7 0.3
HN Albæk and Hansen (1995) Denmark       quarterly  0.3 0.7
Hires from employment
HE Anderson and Burgess (1994) USA     annual/panel  1.0 0.7




Explanation: UO is unemployment outflow (in some cases only males), H is total hires, HU is hires from
unemployment, HO hires from out of the labour force, F is filled vacancies, HN is hires from non-
employment, HE is hires from employment.
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Estimation method: iterative seemingly unrelated regression estimation
_____________________________________________________________________________
Fixed effects
parameter   value t value parameter  valuet value
ξ0  1.418  (16.02) φ0  7.795  (91.26)
ξ1  0.592  (4.446) φ1  1.068  (8.244)
ξ2  0.371  (4.088) φ2  0.403  (4.994)
ξ3  1.572  (11.12) φ3  0.566  (4.115)
ξ4 -0.012 (-0.149) φ4 -0.438 (-6.402)
ξ5  0.748  (6.616) φ5  0.290  (2.716)
Joint effects
parameter  value   t value
α   0.148  (4.436)
β   0.166  (8.370)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R2  0.460  0.778
σ  0.273  0.211
N×T   144    144
____________________________________________________________________________
*) The variables labelled i are sectoral dummy variables for the six sectors in our analysis. The indices refer to the
following sectors: man to manufacturing, con to construction, cs1 to commercial services 1, cs2 to commercial
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Table 3. Estimation results of the matching model, second specification, 1989.I-1994.IV
____________________________________________________________________________
Model specification*)
where X = 0.1E + 0.5B + 0.07N
_____________________________________________________________________________
Estimation method: iterative seemingly unrelated regression estimation
_____________________________________________________________________________
Fixed effects
parameter   value t value parameter valuet value
ξ0 -2.728 (-11.49) φ0  6.750  (80.69)
ξ1  0.788  (9.759) φ1 -0.429 (-3.452)
ξ2  0.502  (6.924) φ2 -0.183 (-3.094)
ξ3  1.744  (19.73) φ3 -0.877 (-6.629)
ξ4  0.073  (1.050) φ4 -0.849 (-22.26)
ξ5  0.876  (11.25) φ5 -0.799 (-8.436)
Joint effects
parameter  value   t value
α   0.744  (20.12)
β   0.160  (8.634)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R2  0.560  0.963
σ  0.246  0.086
N×T     144    144
____________________________________________________________________________
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Estimation method: iterative seemingly unrelated regression estimation
_____________________________________________________________________________
Fixed effects
parameter   value t value parameter valuet value
ξ0 -4.089 (-7.757) φ0 -1.613 (-4.779)
ξ1 -1.446 (-4.550) φ1 -1.505 (-10.96)
ξ2 -0.949 (-5.233) φ2 -0.703 (-8.298)
ξ3 -1.205 (-3.108) φ3 -2.069 (-11.97)
ξ4 -1.658 (-8.788) φ4 -1.320 (-12.41)
ξ5 -2.613 (-6.593) φ5 -1.893 (-9.204)
Joint effects
parameter  value   t value
α   1.120  (16.63)
β   0.183  (9.353)
γ  -0.537 (-7.841)
δ   1.296  (16.59)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R2  0.757  0.957
σ  0.185  0.094
N×T   144    144
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Figure 1. Flows into employment.
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APPENDIX 1. DATA: SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Fue,i Flow of persons with unemployment insurance benefit to a job, for sector i.
source: Sociale verzekeringsraad, Het beroep op de Werkloosheidswet, omvang 
en ontwikkeling.
Fi Flow of filled vacancies for sector i
source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
Ui Number of persons receiving unemployment insurance benefit, for sector i.
source: Sociale verzekeringsraad, Het beroep op de Werkloosheidswet, omvang
en ontwikkeling.
Si Total number of job searchers, consisting of unemployed and employed job 0
searchers and job searchers not in the labour force: UR+?1Ei+?2N. Size of this stock
is unknown
Xi Total number of job searchers, excluding those with an unemployment insurance
benefit. Size of this stock is unknown.
URi Registered unemployment, composed of both persons with an unemployment
insurance benefit and persons with welfare benefit (unemployment support).
source:  Central Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
Ei Number of jobs in sector i.
source:  Central Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
B Number of persons receiving a welfare benefit (interpolated)
source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
Vi Number of vacancies for sector i.
source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
N Number of non-participants, defined as population of age 20-64 minus employed and
unemployment benefit recipients, N=P - Ei - Ui - B
source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
All relevant data, used for estimation, are from 1988.IV-1994.IV
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APPENDIX 2. SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION
This appendix describes the classification of the sectors we distinguish in terms of the SBI-index
in The Netherlands (similar to the SIC-classification). SBI 1, mining, and SBI 4, public utility,
have been omitted. The first is very small in The Netherlands and the latter is also small and more
or less constant over the period 1989-1994.
We have chosen this classification, because it corresponds to the classification used for the




Agriculture 0 Agriculture, fishery
Manufacturing 2/3 Manufacturing
Construction 5 Construction and installation
Commercial services 1  6 and 8 Hotels, restaurants, wholesale and retail trade,
 Banks, real estate and insurance companies
Commercial services 2 7 Transport, storage and communication
Non-commercial services 9 Other (non-commercial) services, government
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APPENDIX 3. ELASTICITY BETWEEN X AND U
This appendix presents the estimation results when the elasticity γ in equation (4) is estimated
directly. The presence of a unit root in the log of all three variables in (4) cannot convincingly be
rejected. There is however no clear-cut evidence of cointegration. When we proceed with
estimating (4) in log-linear form and imposing an error-correction specification, we find after
simplification:
∆log(Xi,t ) = 2.481 – 0.118 [ log(Xi,t-1 ) + 1.622 log(Ei,t-1 ) – 0.113 log(Ui,t-1 )]
  (2.880) (-2.014)      (3.580) (-1.583)
R2 = 0.839 σ = 0.0017 DW = 1.629 T = 23  (1989.II - 1994.IV)
The long-term equilibrium relation between X and U is given by the error-correction part,
logX = 0.11 logU,
where the coefficient of logU equals the elasticity γ=εxu. Note that the elasticity is smaller than 1,
but not negative and that the value is not significantly different from zero. This analysis therefore
does not provide reliable information concerning the value of the elasticity εxu.
